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Abstract Mel Pollner regularly cautioned researchers not to argue with the members
of settings under consideration. He warned against substituting the researcher’s
meaning for the meanings of those being studied. This article discusses facets of the
caution as they relate to the research process. Seemingly simple, the tenet is nuanced
in application. The article adds to the nuance by distinguishing what is called the
“replacement” of meaning with the “displacement” of meaning, providing a way of
understanding what members could mean if the contexts and settings of their
accounts were taken into consideration.
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“Don’t argue with the members.”
Mel Pollner regularly offered this tenet in relation to sociological observation and
commentary. Deceptively simple, yet fraught with possibilities, it harbors consider-
able analytic force. We first heard Mel’s counsel years ago when one of the authors
(Holstein) was enthusiastically recounting experiences from fieldwork in a mental
health court. Having observed hours of courtroom interaction that apparently
contradicted courtroom personnel’s claims that the law was being conscientiously
applied, Holstein was excited about the prospect of writing about the sociological
irony that the “law-in-practice” was not delivering “justice” as the “law-on-the-
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books” prescribed. In his genial way, Mel considered the irony, appreciated it for
what it might have been, then cautioned: “Don’t argue with the members.”
In this instance, first and foremost, Mel was instructing a neophyte in the basics
of “ethnomethodological indifference.” This fundamental stance vis-à-vis everyday
social encounters precludes the characterization of members as deficient, patholog-
ical, or irrational, but opens space for seeing and hearing how local orderliness is
indigenously organized through practices of mundane reason (Pollner 1987). In his
way, Pollner was recapitulating his version of Garfinkel and Sacks’ (1970)
admonition that ethnomethodological studies must seek “to describe member’s
accounts of formal structures wherever and by whomever they are done, while
abstaining from all judgments of their adequacy, value, importance, necessity,
practicality, success, or consequentiality” (p. 345). Putting it simply, Mel was
advising not to let the sociological proclivity for invidious comparisons obscure the
artful “worlding” practices unfolding before one’s very eyes (see Pollner 1987).
That, however, is not the only message we’ve taken from the tenet. A few years
later, one of us (Gubrium) presented a research seminar at UCLA, where Pollner was
in the audience. In the lively discussion following the presentation, graduate students
and faculty members offered the usual critical comments and raised a variety of
analytic challenges. At one point, someone suggested that Gubrium may have
overlooked the “possible hidden meaning,” as she put it, embedded in one of the
conversational extracts he presented. The possible hidden meaning in this instance
involved the alleged real motives behind what was being said. Pollner eventually
jumped in, responded supportively, but also advised her that one “shouldn’t argue
with the members,” challenging the empirical grounding of the suggestion. Once
again, Mel was showing his respect for member’s practices by cautioning not to put
words (or intentions) in members’ mouths, so to speak.
On still another occasion, following the daily proceedings at a research
conference, we took a long, pleasant summer evening walk with Mel. Mel the
“vaudevillian” kept us laughing, of course, but our stroll was interlaced with cogent
questions and supportive advice regarding our research program. He appreciated the
new directions we were taking, but, again bringing a humorous, light touch to the
matter, he cautioned that we needed to take care not to slip inadvertently into
arguments with the members lest their everyday wisdom and practical competence
be overshadowed by our concerns. It was vintage Mel: smart, persuasive, yet open-
minded, and standing fast to ethnomethodology’s cultivated respect for mundane
reason.
Like many others, we’ve long appreciated the usefulness of this position and the
ways Mel recommended taking account of it. As ethnomethodologically-informed
sociologists1, we’ve heeded Mel’s advice—often implicitly—but we’ve also tried to
explore and expand its implications. In various ways, we’ve avoided arguments with
the members in our own research but we have pursued ramifications of the tenet that
are not immediately evident. We’ve asked ourselves, what does it mean concretely
not to argue with the members, given the varied ways sociologists investigate and
1 Pollner himself has been called a “protoethnomethodologist” (Lynch 1993), implying a reluctance to
abandon concern for standpoint and method as cornerstones of reasonable analysis in favor of a more
radical postanalytic version of ethnomethodology (e.g. Garfinkel 2002).
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describe the social world? Turning the question around, we’ve asked, what does it
mean to argue with the members—to take exception to, or to ignore, what they say
about themselves, others, and the world they live in? We’ve mused on the analytic
products of such arguments. In particular, we’ve long been concerned with the
contextual (indexical) construction of meaning and action and were systematically
and comparatively considering how members themselves relate to context,
opportunities, and resources for making meaning. We have, in a sense, looked
behind member’s backs, but in a fashion that respectfully asks “Where are they
coming from?” without denigrating local demands for accountability. In the
following pages, we first explore how the admonition to avoid arguing with
members shaped Mel’s own work. We then illustrate what happens when arguments
break out. Finally, we turn to ways in which the tenet has been borrowed and
honored, but also adapted, in service to other forms of analysis.
Before we begin, however, we offer some words of caution. First, we note that
Pollner did not necessarily imply that researchers actually argued with members,
presenting contrary opinions in face-to-face interaction with them. The tenet referred
more generally to the analyst’s practice of taking exception to or “debunking”mundane
reason and everyday wisdom as part of the analysis of members’ actions. We also note
that just what constitutes being a “member” must remain problematic to some extent,
because the idea of membership itself is continuously constructed in interaction and is
subject to interaction’s going concerns. What is clear is that membership—who is or
isn’t a member or actor in the immediate scheme of things—is part of the dynamics of
social interaction, not something figured separately. This needs to be kept in view lest
interactively unfolding senses of membership be replaced by other sources of
assignment such as official definitions or structural and cultural designations (Francis
and Hester 2004, pp. 1–3, 205–206, 210–211).
Heeding His Own Advice
“Don’t argue with the members” has both analytic and empirical implications. Some
of Pollner’s earliest published work implicitly brings the tenet into play through his
critique of Howard Becker’s version of labeling theory (Becker 1963). Generations
of sociologists recognize Becker’s paradigm-building pronouncement that “The
deviant is one to whom that label has been successfully applied; deviant behavior is
behavior that people so label” (p. 9).2 While this observation has clear ethno-
methodological resonance, Becker goes on to juxtapose and implicitly critique what
he calls the “common-sense premise” that there is something inherently deviant
(pathological) about people or acts that violate social rules. Becker then offers a
four-fold typology of deviant behavior (p. 20), including “conforming,” the “falsely
accused,” the “secret deviant”, and the “pure deviant.”
Pollner (1978, 1987) recognized at least two ways in which the typology was
arguing with the members. The first was obvious. In critically juxtaposing a
2 While Becker’s Outsiders (1963) is widely cited as the inspiration for the development of labeling
theory, Edwin Lemert (1951) and John Kitsuse (1962) had published earlier work featuring the same
argument, as Becker himself admits.
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common-sense (mundane) definition of labeling with his analytic version, Becker
implicitly denigrated the common-sense version. His argument suggested a flawed
members’ version of deviance as compared to the more astute outsider’s analytic
prescription, without carefully considering the common-sense model for its mundane
sensibility and utility. Becker’s foray was not the ethnomethodological indifference
that would encourage a more disinterested or appreciative view of members’
practices, a stance that was characteristic of Pollner’s own work.
Perhaps more importantly, Pollner noted that Becker believed he could spot
deviance better than could members themselves. Pollner pointed out that Becker’s
four-fold typology explicitly violated Becker’s own definition of deviance. The
categories of falsely accused and secret deviant, Pollner noted, are conceptual
anomalies—theoretical non sequiturs—since both rest on the premise that deviance
inheres in something other than the act of labeling, and can thus be misidentified. If
deviance is behavior so labeled, for example, it is impossible to have “secret”
deviance, since no label has been applied. Similarly, there should be no distinction
between the falsely accused and the pure deviant, since, by Becker’s definition, both
have been labeled deviant. From Pollner’s perspective, Becker famous four-fold
typology of deviance (Becker 1963, p. 20) could be reduced to a two-category
typology: 1) “Deviant”—persons/acts responded to as deviant and 2) “Not
Deviant”—persons/acts not responded to as deviants (Pollner 1987, p. 98).
Inadvertently, perhaps, Becker imported features of the common-sense version of
deviance into his own model, tacitly incorporating the notion of rule-breaking or “real”
deviance, then positioning the analyst as the arbiter of “correct” labeling. As Pollner
(1978, p. 270) put it, Becker conceived of the community’s (members’) role in the
labeling process as resembling “an umpire calling balls and strikes” who sometimes got
it wrong according to the outside arbiter (e.g., the unidentified secret deviant or the
innocent who is falsely accused). Disregarding his own definition, Becker in effect was
“arguing with members” that he (the analyst) could better identify deviance than they
could—using their own mundane criteria. While Pollner’s central argument revolved
around the revelation that Becker had actually appropriated features of mundane
labeling into his own sociological theory, Pollner was also displaying the consequences
of implicitly arguing with the members by attempting to debunk everyday practices.
Mel tried to practice what he preached in his own work. In addition to his
research documenting mundane reason in a traffic court (Pollner 1987), his
collaboration with Lynn McDonald-Wikler (Pollner and McDonald-Wikler 1985),
especially, offered a fascinating glimpse of member’s reality-constructing practices.
In their words, Pollner and McDonald-Wikler conducted a “case study of a family’s
attribution of competence to a severely retarded child.”3 Their field work took them
into a professional, clinical environment where a variety of mental health specialists
had conscientiously diagnosed 5 ½year old Mary as severely retarded. Nevertheless,
members of the Mary’s family insisted that Mary was “normal” and was just putting
on an act of being retarded. Pollner and McDonald-Wikler’s analysis is a tour de
force in appreciating members’ every day, indigenous practices for sustaining the
competence of a fellow member.
3 We use the term “retarded” in our discussion to reflect its usage in the original research. The term
“retarded” was clinically appropriate at the time Pollner and McDonald-Wikler conducted their research.
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The question of arguing with the members arises from this study in several
ways. Most notably, while there was ample clinical evidence that family members
were deluded about Mary’s condition, Pollner and McDoanld-Wikler avoided
arguments through the way they approached the idea of locally constructed
interactional competence, family membership, and, in particular, the competence
of the retarded child to be a regular family member. They did not argue for or
against the child’s actual competence based on their field material, but rather
investigated how family members’ themselves visibly accomplished a sense of the
child’s competence. They could have provided independent conversational and
ethnographic evidence to confirm or disconfirm the clinical staff’s designation of
incompetent membership, but chose to set that aside to investigate how the family
members assigned competency in their everyday reasoning about the matter. Doing
otherwise would have questioned the capabilities of family members’ to judge the
child’s abilities, thus putting the researchers in the position of arguing with the members
(which is exactly the position the professionals involved were obliged to take).
McDonald-Wikler first brought the case to Pollner’s attention because it had been
the object of curiosity and scrutiny by the staff at the Neuropsychiatric Institute for
quite some time. Her initial interest was to understand the intractability of Mary’s
family in the face of a diagnosis that had been thoroughly “worked up” and
discussed before Pollner and McDonald-Wikler arrived on the scene. The diagnostic
practices through which Mary’s retardation or “incompetence” were no longer
available for investigation, so Pollner and McDonald-Wikler turned their attention to
how Mary’s family members managed to vigorously contend that Mary was, indeed,
quite normal. As Pollner and McDonald-Wikler explain in their article,
Family members stated that Mary was a verbal and intelligent child who
malingered and refused to speak in public in order to embarrass the family.
Extensive clinical observation and examination revealed Mary to be severely
retarded and unable to perform at anywhere near the level of competence
claimed by her parents and two older sibs. (p. 242)
Note that what in family member’s reasoning was unusual behavior was
“arguably” viewed by the consultants as retardation. The consultants’ applicable
vocabulary was already geared to produce findings of pathology; the family’s claim
was destined to be arguable. This difference implicated all family members. Not only
were the consultants primed to argue with the child’s existential status in the family,
but they also were set to argue with the family’s own competence in accepting their
diagnosis. The clinical report suggested the diagnosis of folie à famille—a medical
framing of perceptual incompetence extending to all family members—was a
distinct possibility. The clinical gaze was ceaseless, set to argue with any and all who
questioned the assessment of the child (see Foucault 1965).
Bracketing Mary’s competence, Pollner and McDonald-Wikler posed different
questions, centered on members’ mundane reasoning about their child’s competence
in the family context. The nature of their questions was clearly informed by their
commitment to avoid arguing with the members. The researchers were interested in
how family members’ ordinary reasoning served to gloss the child’s behavior as
competent, specifically what ordinary rules guided the family’s interpretations of the
child’s behavior. They focused on the locally reflexive organization of competence
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with the family without invidiously comparing family practices to clinical standards.
They asked, by what mundane interpretive means did this happen? How, as a matter
of interpretive practice, did family members construct Mary as bizarre in public but
as an otherwise normal child at home?
Our analysis of the available materials has been instigated by the following
questions: How does the family do it? What sorts of skills, practices, and
strategies are utilized to create and then [reflexively] “discover” Mary’s
competence? . . . The yield of our analysis has been a set of [interpretive]
practices by which family members created Mary’s “perfection.” (p. 244)
Pollner and McDonald-Wikler identified six interpretive techniques, the everyday
applications of which constructed and sustained Mary as a normal child with the
ability to account for her conduct. These included “framing” whatever Mary did in
the context of the home as normal; “postscripting” whatever Mary did after the fact
as reasonably motivated; and “putting words” into Mary’s mouth. If, from a clinical
perspective, the application of such techniques might be construed as part of the
folly of the family, the family itself might have been deemed pathological. But
adhering to the tenet of not arguing with the members, the interpretive practices that
the researchers unveiled stood as evidence of local reality-constructing practices that
served to normalize Mary’s actions and identity within the family environment.
This study eventually proved problematic from an epistemological point of view.
Pollner and McDonald-Wikler might have inserted themselves into the local debate
over the child’s competence, but instead chose to examine dispassionately how
evidence in this debate was accountably produced by one side (the family’s). When
the researchers submitted the article for peer review and publication, reviewers
raised questions that harkened the “ontological gerrymandering” (Woolgar and
Pawluch 1985) controversy that was brewing at the time (personal communication).
The researchers were chided for taking an authoritative position vis-à-vis the “real
reality” of Mary’s situation. The criticism, however, was ill-conceived, considering
the fact that Pollner and McDonald-Wikler remained agnostic regarding the issue of
whether clinical diagnoses or family interpretive practices were more in touch with a
“real” reality. As the researchers put it, their analytic approach undertook “close
examination of the artful, minute, and continuous work through which what might
be characterized as ‘myth,’ ‘distortion’, or ‘delusion’ from outside the family is
rendered a reality for them on the inside” (p. 242). They carefully circumscribed the
field of analysis—the inner interactional workings of the family—and avoided
arguing about “real realities” with both family members and outsiders to the family
scene. They left open the possibility that they might just as well have examined the
clinical practices of the psychiatric diagnosticians for the ways in which they
mundanely produced evidence of Mary’s retardation. As Pollner and McDonald-
Wikler noted, “The social constructionist attitude does not provide privileged
exemptions for ‘expert’ or ‘scientific’ constructions of reality. The tacit practices by
which clinicians develop, coordinate, use, and defend their versions of reality are as
amenable to analysis as those of the families they study” (p. 242). Pollner and
McDonald-Wikler had simply chosen to “bracket” one set of actors and practices as
topics for analysis while remaining indifferent to other—competing—actors and
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practices. They neither argued with the family members under study nor the
clinicians, in whose practices they remained temporarily disinterested.
When Arguments Erupt
While Pollner tried to adhere to his own admonition, sociologists of the latter half of
the 20th century often took the opposite tack. The proclivity to unmask or debunk
everyday practices led to frequent arguments with the members, both tacit and
occasionally overt. This is evident, for example, in a longstanding debate about the
relative value of participant observation versus interviewing for uncovering the
actual meaning of behavior. One of the earliest statements came from William Foote
Whyte (1943), who touted the value of participant observation over survey
interviews in the Introduction to his seminal ethnography, Street Corner Society:
The Social Structure of an Italian Slum. Writing about the need for intimate
knowledge of social life if we are to understand members’ actions, Whyte
complained about the “limited body of information” that surveys had generated
about Cornerville, his pseudonym for the Boston slum he studied in the 1930s. He
was annoyed by inadequacy of the information that members provided through
survey interviews, implicitly suggesting that what members reveal by way of surveys
is less authentic or revealing than information collected through participant
observation. The complaint implicated the survey interview method as much as the
information provided by the members being interviewed.
A decade later, in a now-classic statement, Howard Becker and Blanche Geer
(1957) also championed the use of participant observation. In doing so, however,
they highlighted an additional, but rather uncommon, way to argue with the
members. According to Becker and Geer, interviewing shortchanges the everyday
realities of meaning by taking members at their word rather than considering their
actions. Interview reports, they argued, may be filled with falsehoods and
exaggerations. Actions, observable as field events (what people actually do, not
what they say or report about it), reveal better what members are up to. The authors
are unmistakably clear about this.
The most complete form of the sociological datum, after all, is the form
in which the participant observer gathers it: An observation of some social
event, the events that precede and follow it, and explanations of its
meaning by participants and spectators, before, during, and after its
occurrence. Such a datum gives us more information about the event
under study than data gathered by any other sociological method.
Participant observation can thus provide us with a yardstick against which
to measure the completeness of data gathered in other ways, a model
which can serve to let us know what orders of information escape us
when we use other methods. (p. 28)
As Becker and Geer proceed to illustrate and valorize participant observa-
tion, they explain that the astute observer is better able to decipher social
situations than members themselves. On one occasion, this admittedly invited
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an actual argument with members. Becker et al. (1961) had conducted extensive
field research on student culture in a medical school. As Becker and Geer note, the
method of participant observation put them in the position to know better than
members (in this case, the medical students) what might have transpired
interactionally between medical students and their supervising resident physicians.
According to one of the researchers’ fieldnotes, “Before I joined the group, several
of the students told me that the residents were “mean,” “nasty,” “bitchy”, and so
on, and had backed these characterizations up with evidence of particular actions”
(p. 31). The researchers went on to argue that their observations told a different
story. In this instance, the researchers actually argued in person with the medical
students, a flagrant violation of Pollner’s tenet.
After I began participating daily with the student on his service, a number
of incidents made it clear that the situation was not quite like this. Finally,
the matter came completely into the open. I was present when one of the
residents suggested a technique that might have prevented a minor relapse
in a patient assigned to one of the students. . . . This student reported to
several other students that the resident had “chewed him out” for failing to
use this technique: “What the hell business has he got chewing me out
about that for? No one ever told me I was supposed to do it that way.” I
interrupted to say, “He didn’t really chew you out. I thought he was pretty
decent about it.” Another student said, “Any time they say anything at all
to us I consider it a chewing out. Any time they say anything about how
we did things, they are chewing us out, no matter how God damn nice they
are about it.” (p. 31)
As Paul Atkinson and Amanda Coffey (2002) point out in their chapter of the
Handbook of Interviewing revisiting Becker and Geer’s article, the latter were
aware of the socially structured character of complaints and acknowledged the
sociological relevance of “inaccurate” member claims and counterclaims in
relationships of authority. The problem is that Becker and Geer were not interested
in analytically naturalizing or topicalizing the inaccuracies. This would have
turned the inaccuracies analytically into functional, even correct claims of a sort
under the prevailing circumstances. Becker and Geer discounted the students
actions (the claims, in this case) because they judged them to be false, but in doing
so, overlooked an analytic opportunity to consider the claims as part of students’
locally situated mundane reasoning and identity formation. They failed to take up
the question of what the purpose of such claims might be in the circumstances.
This would have turned the analytic table, so to speak, away from an argument
with the members into an examination of student accounts rendered in particular
contexts of accountability. Instead, Becker and Geer replaced the accounts with
what they, as observers, claimed to know better from their fieldwork and left it at
that.
Accounts, of course, are as discernible in interviews as they are through
participant observation. Acknowledging this immediately levels the methodological
playing field and devalorizes participant observation. As Pollner would undoubtedly
remind us in this case, what members do with words in interviews is as genuine and
scientifically valuable as what they do with words in more “natural” settings. Both
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are fields of empirical material, neither of which warrants arguing with the
members.4
In light of Becker and Geer’s argument with the medical students, it is interesting to
note that the new oral history may lean towards Pollner’s stance regarding arguments
over the truth of matters at hand. Interviews with livingmembers of historical scenes, for
example, are not evaluated exclusively in terms of their accuracy, but are considered in
terms of what members do with words when they offer accounts of experience (see
Cándida Smith 2002). Alessandro Portelli’s (1991) essay “The Death of Luigi Trastulli:
Memory and the Event” is instructive. Portelli takes interviewees at their word and
analyzes accounts of steel worker Luigi Trastulli’s death following a walkout in Terni,
Italy on March 17, 1949 when laborers left a factory to protest the signing of the North
Atlantic Treaty by the Italian government. Richard Cándida Smith (2002) describes
Portelli’s approach to working-class residents’ interview accounts of the event.
Their reconstructions of the past were factually wrong. Their accounts merged
or scrambled events and at times referred to events that never occurred. In
effect, their collective stories had created an alternative chronology that
allowed them to maintain their own historical experience.
Portelli argues that chronological inaccuracy in the narrative helped the
community maintain a sense of continuing to have a future and retaining the
possibility of political resurgence during a time of retreat. . . . Portelli’s
analysis suggests that the community’s ability to maintain identity rested on a
utopian, historically inaccurate, but culturally effective myth of the past. The
narratives kept alive an alternative future that preserved for several decades the
possibility of independent, worker-based action, even if, for the most part,
members of the community were actively participating in the reconstruction of
Italian society around international markets. (pp. 720–21)
Cándida-Smith is not saying that Portelli ignores the inaccurate chronology, but
rather considers what function the inaccuracy serves in the broader context of
collective memory. The workers’ narratives, despite (or because of) their inaccuracy,
serve to sustain community identity, Portelli explains. The recontextualized
inaccuracy becomes the focus of interest, not the ostensible inaccuracies themselves.
Portelli does not aim to replace the inaccurate chronology with a more accurate one,
but rather displaces the “inaccuracy” into a different context and asks what function
is serves there, which is what Becker and Geer themselves might have asked about
the operating “inaccuracy” of student complaints in the context of student culture.
It’s an important distinction, to which we return in the last section of the article.
Longstanding Reductionist Habits
Two longstanding analytic habits regularly lead social researchers to inadvertently
argue with members. Both reduce members’ actions to popular understandings about
4 The idea of the universally accountable nature of members’ actions was still in its infancy when Becker
and Geer wrote their article and they would be unfairly criticized for not taking this up (see Heritage 1984,
chapter 6).
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the substance of members’ actions (see Silverman 2000). One habit views members’
actions substantially as forms of inner life; the other views actions substantially as
matters of culture or social structure, which were once called “social forces.” As
resources for interpreting members’ actions, these habits may be useful as long as
researchers don’t replace mundane understandings with what is figured instead to be
their “real” substance. This might amount to viewing actions as the result of, say,
motivation or perception in the case of replacements with the substance of inner life.
Similarly, the substance of culture or social structure—say norms or socioeconomic
status—might be conjured up as the animating forces behind behavior.5
The first of these reductions was broached at the start of this article, in our
recollection of a seminar participant’s reference to the possible “hidden meaning” of
comments in a conversational extract. By referring to unobservable psychological
states and processes that might have been at work, the comment invited the use of
inner states such as hidden motives and underlying feelings as analytic resources for
understanding members’ actions. It was an analytic reduction in the sense that “the
interaction order” (Goffman 1983) was reduced to the vocabulary and related
realities of inner life. (See C. Wright Mills’ [1940] seminal article on what he called
“vocabularies of motive” for a nonreductionist and topicalized approach to member
accounts of intention.) It was Erving Goffman’s view, with which Pollner would
agree, that the interaction order has its own operating logic, replete with the
contingencies of everyday life. To reduce it to inner life in this case eclipses a whole
world of human experience that might otherwise be understood on its own terms. In
doing so, the researcher implicitly argues with members’ overt hearable statements
and observable actions. Examples of this reduction are legion; it’s what one would
expect, given that members’ actions in our society are commonly interpreted in
terms of a vocabulary of intentions, thoughts, feelings, values, unconscious motives,
identities, and similar elements of inner life.
The second reduction also is a popular source of replacement. In this case, the
substance of members’ actions is constructed in terms of a vocabulary of allegedly
larger social forms, such as culture, society, class, and status. This reduction
overshadows how members themselves use such constructs in interpreting their lives
and actions. We can forestall such arguments, however, by concertedly referring to
culture, class, and other macroscopic social forms as “vocabularies” rather than as
agentic social forces. This means viewing the vocabularies as accounts and
topicalizing them, rather than treating them as resources that trivialize ordinary
usage and mundane reason.
Everyday social settings routinely deploy inner lives or social forces as
interpretive resources, taking us beyond research applications. Such commonplace
reductions are the very stuff of a “form of life,” as philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein
(1953) would put it. Their vocabularies are the way most of us reference the realities
of life, so it’s natural to turn to them to give substance to members’ actions. The rub
is that we all are members—sociologists included; the trick of the tenet for
5 Such replacements are versions of what ethnomethodologists refer to as confounding the topics of one’s
research with the resources for studying them (Zimmerman and Pollner 1970; Pollner 1987), that is,
turning aspects of a proper topic of research—for example, what members “do” with inner life and culture
or social structure—into an analytic toolkit for interpreting and assigning meaning to members’ actions.
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researchers is to recognize this in our analytic work and become disciplined about
the distinction between topic and resource. Topicalizing members’ everyday
resources and practices requires attending to how members “do” experience, how
they construct their inner lives and social worlds, among other possible domains of
experience. Pollner’s tenet reminds us of the importance of taking members’ work
seriously by applying a stance of ontological indifference in order to see how the
mundane constructs what it is commonly reduced to.
Replacement Versus Displacement
As we have seen, arguments with members emerge when researchers replace or
challenge members’ actions or meanings with their own or other exogenous
understandings. Arguments are not necessarily forthcoming when researchers
displace mundane understandings to other contexts in order to gain broader
understandings of the locally sensitive deftness of mundane reason. Replacement,
as we have seen, might take the form of ascribing hidden meanings or cultural
prescriptives to members’ actions. In contrast, researchers would not be arguing with
members if they tracked the displacement of members’ actions—whether in talk,
activity, or both—to alternate contexts, that might construct talk, behavior, and
meanings in contrasting terms, rendering them substantively different. Such
displacement allows researchers to view mundane reason and everyday practices
in light of alternate social environments and practical purposes at hand. This renders
everyday practices more visible by virtue of the possible contrasts that emerge across
contexts, allowing for the description of situational differences.
Does Pollner’s tenet allow us to capitalize analytically on displacement rather
than replacement in order to bring contextual matters into view as topics in their own
right, rather than treating the matters as everyday resources? We believe Mel would
think this was possible. Beyond his characteristic open-mindedness, we also note his
willingness to bracket particular aspects of experience in order to gain analytic
purchase on other aspects of experience in his own research into folie à famille,
Alcoholics Anonymous support groups, and traffic courts. While Pollner stood fast
to ethnomethodology’s cultivated respect for mundane reason, his empirical work
indicated that he knew the importance of recognizing the varied situated realities of
members’ lives. Elsewhere, we have called these contextual parameters the whats of
membership (see Gubrium and Holstein 1997; Holstein and Gubrium 2000). It is
important to recognize that members’ actions and concerns vary in discernable ways
across time and social space. Members don’t do the same things with words
everywhere, but discernibly adapt how they use and apply them to the circumstances
at hand. The self, for example, is discursively constructed—talked into being—in
distinctly different ways under the auspices of an Alcoholics Anonymous support
group than in other realms of everyday life (Pollner and Stein 2001; Holstein and
Gubrium 2000).
Pollner recognized that the admonition not to argue with members had to be
strategically but temporarily set aside in order to take account of the distribution of
the forms of life to which the tenet otherwise applied. Forms of life are systems of
usage which are shaped by circumstance as much as they are ways of forming
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everyday realities; they are socially situated language games, as Wittgenstein viewed
them (Wittgenstein 1953; see Holstein and Gubrium 2011). Accordingly, the whats
of everyday life are as important as the hows. In documenting the whats, the hows
must necessarily (but temporarily) be relegated to the analytic background, taking
along with them the tenet about not arguing with the members.
The hows of everyday life—“the work whereby a world per se and the attendant
concerns which derive from a world per se . . . are constructed and sustained” (Pollner
1987, p. 7)—have been ethnomethodology’s central concern. But the displacements of
diverse whats demand attention as well. For example, the hows of social interaction,
such as the everyday interactional work of constructing the competence of a severely
retarded child, as we saw earlier, wouldn’t make much sense if we paid no attention to
what was at stake in the matter. We need to account analytically for, among other
things, the institutional context of the diagnosis of the child as retarded, the
professional obligation to assess what the family called “bizarre,” the family’s sense
that basically their child was normal, and the possible diagnosis of folie à famille.
These whats, among many others, are highly consequential for those concerned.
Exercising a concern for the whats is not arguing with the members. Rather, it is a
concern with figuring the situated realities from different members’ points of view
and describing what everyone concerned is up against (or has available to them) in
constructing the identity of the child in question. In practice, the whats reflexively
inform the hows. Displacements differentially condition the work of constructing the
child’s identity. The consequences of the identity constructed cannot be understood
from the interactional hows alone. The six interpretive techniques or hows that
Pollner and McDonald-Wikler identified in their study could apply to any number of
circumstances and, in that regard, do not exclusively apply to the normalization of
retarded children. The personal and societal relevance of the hows must be discerned
from the whats of the matter.
Conversely, the whats at issue, such as a family’s concern, a neighbor’s casual
interest, or the professional responsibility of a clinical diagnostician were not fixed
realities. They were subject to the identity work of members of various circumstances.
Family members applied a vocabulary and definitional technology that constructed a
normal child from within their “family circle,” as it were. They didn’t use a medical
vocabulary or diagnostic technology, but, under different circumstances, they could
have and, in a medicalized society like ours, they likely would have.
From Pollner and McDonald-Wikler’s article, we have no way of knowing how
the professionals involved applied a medical and diagnostic vocabulary to link
related categories with the empirical particulars of Mary’s case; this was largely
accomplished before the case came to Pollner’s attention. The researchers instead
chose to focus on how the family constructed Mary’s competence. But, in principle
and given the opportunity, Pollner and McDonald-Wikler (or some other researchers)
could have studied the social practices through which a medically-appropriate
diagnosis was assembled. This would turn them to the narrative environment of the
clinic, its predominant discourses, and the related local, professional, and
disciplinary discursive resources for understanding and defining Mary’s situation.
We do know from other studies of professional categorization processes that the
development and application of hows in everyday life is multifaceted and artful.
What results can be amazingly complicated and inventive (see Garfinkel 1967,
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Buckholdt and Gubrium 1978). The whats of the matter are reflexively related to the
hows in that substantive outcomes, such as being or not being normal or retarded, are
not a straightforward matter of linking “facts” with available or preferred categories,
since both the “facts” and the “categories” are subject to the interpretive
contingencies of their construction. The contextual features of any setting are
themselves locally constructed members’ accomplishments. Thus the hows of the
setting are reflexively implicated in what the setting comes to be.
The broad analytic challenge of displacement is to document the interplay between
the hows and the whats of mundane reason. Systematically and dispassionately
attending to both the hows then the whats (or vice versa), while recognizing that their
reflexive interplay is the constitutive basis of the actions and circumstances under
consideration, can safeguard against arguing with the members. In our own work, we
have relied on a procedure we’ve called “analytic bracketing” (Gubrium and Holstein
1997, 2009; Holstein and Gubrium 2011) to deal with the reflexive relationship
between the hows and the whats of everyday life. In this procedure, the researcher
alternately orients to everyday realities as both the products of members’ interpretive
practices and as the substantive resources from which realities are reflexively
constructed. At one moment, the researcher may be analytically uninterested in the
circumstances of an everyday interactional setting in order to document their mundane
constructions. In the next analytic move, he or she brackets mundane practices in order
to describe the local availability, distribution, and/or regulation of resources and
constraints for reality construction. The analysis of the constant interplay between the
hows and whats of reality construction mirrors the lived interplay between constitutive
social interaction and its immediate context, resources, restraints, and going concerns.
The strength of the tenet “don’t argue with the members” is its ability to rein in
the sociologist’s tendency to look for members’ meaning beyond mundane
attributions and reasoning. This strength can be extended to other aspects of
reflexively constituted reality. Pollner wrote about the way what he called “narrative
maps” “pre-presented the dimensions and denizens of a social world” to neophyte
members of Alcoholics Anonymous (Pollner and Stein 1996, p. 204). He took
seriously the ways in which mundane processes of self construction were
conditioned by organizational stocks of knowledge and institutionalized ways of
talking selves into being (Pollner and Stein 2001). If Mel were still here to help coin
a tenet to turn our analytic attention to the whats as much as to the hows of
membership, he also could very well have advised “Don’t forget the ‘things’ that
could concern the members.” Taken together, the two tenets keep us focused on the
reflexive interplay between the hows and the whats of everyday realities, extending
analysis across the substantive landscape of mundane reason.
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